We show that the theories: Π More precisely, we locate winning strategies for various Σ 0 3 -games in the L-hierarchy in order to prove the following:
Introduction
The work in this paper was, initially at least, motivated by trying to see how the theory of arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (AQI as defined below) fits in with other subsystems of second order number theory. We had been working with one example of such a definition, essentially a recursive quasi-inductive definition, and had calculated certain ordinals where such definitions reached fixed points or exhibited a looping convergence [15] and [14] . Earlier J. Burgess [2] had in fact distilled from H. Herzberger's notion of a revision sequence [5] the notion of arithmetically quasi-inductive, and shown that the same ordinals appeared. (Herzberger's notion was connected with a "truth operator" and thus, strictly speaking is not arithmetic, but just beyond; however this only makes for a trivial difference.) Other examples of constructions involving such quasi-inductive definitions have appeared in the theory of truth [4] , and in theoretical computer science: S.Kreutzer in [7] uses essentially arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions to formulate a notion of semantics for partial fixed point logics over structures with infinite domains which separates away this logic from inflationary fixed point logic.
Here however we rather mention some of the possibilities that connect these concepts with potential proof theoretical results on the way to looking at ordinal systems for Π 1 3 -CA 0 : for Π 1 2 -CA 0 , by work of Rathjen [9] , [10] , we have that this second level of Comprehension is tied up with the theory of arbitrarily long finite Σ 1 -elementary chains through the L α -hierarchy: the first level L α which is an infinite tower of such models, is the first whose reals form a β-model of Π 1 2 -CA 0 . The same occurs for Π 1 3 -CA 0 : the firstL β whose reals form a β-model of Π 1 3 -CA 0 is the union of an infinite tower of models L ζn ≺ Σ 2 L ζ n+1 and presumably one will need to analyse finite chains of such models to get at an ordinal system for this theory. Seeing that AQI is connected with levels L ζ of the Gödel's L-hierarchy, with Σ 2 -end extensions, (albeit only chains of length 1) analysing the proof theoretic strength of AQI would be a natural stepping stone.
Other notions of inductive definition have been tied to determinacy. Positive monotone arithmetical operators have fixed points bounded by the first admissible ordinal ω (for player I) or definable over it (for the "closed" player II). Solovay [12] showed that, remarkably, for Σ 0 2 -games, strategies for player I in such games occur in L σ where σ is the closure ordinal of Σ 1 1 monotone inductive definitions (and for Player II they lie in the next admissible set beyond it). Tanaka [13] formulated a subsytem of analysis related to Σ [6] has something that seems similar.) However this does not really yet reveal (at least to us) where such strategies lie. A closer reading of Davis' proof of Σ 0 3 -Determinacy shows that it appears provable in KP +Σ 2 -Separation, and thus that winning strategies appear in the least model which is an infinite tower of the form of a union of a chain of submodels L ζn ≺ Σ 2 L ζ n+1 . Whilst we always thought it would be a happy coincidence if Σ 0 3 -Determinacy matched up exactly with AQI we never really believed it would be so, and the theorems here show this. We have not located the exact ordinal where the winning strategies (for either player) appear, but we have shown that for some games they must appear after the first Σ 2 -extendible ξ 0 -that is ξ 0 initiates a Σ 2 -chain of length 1: (lightface) definable parameters allowed (a precise definition is below). Such an ordinal γ occurs before the beginning of the least Σ 2 -chain of length 2:
It seemed to us that even with extra effort, finding exactly at which level each Σ 0 3 game had a strategy might not be very much more illuminating: Martin and Solovay's result mentioned above seems to indicate that any such precise characterisation of these levels might well be in terms of Σ 0 3 games anyway, rather than some exterior defined subsystem of second order number theory, or of particular properties of certain levels of the L-hierarchy.
By Σ 2 -Separationwe mean the usual Axiom of Separation but restricted to formulae that are Σ 2 in the Levy hierarchy. By "KP" we shall mean the usual axioms of Kripke-Platek set theory, but we shall assume these include the Axiom of Infinity. By "KPI 0 " we shall mean the conjunction of the axiom of extensionality together with the assertion "For every set x there is a set y with x ∈ y ∧ (KP) y ". By "KPI" we shall mean "KP + KPI 0. " By "Σ 2 -KP" we shall mean KP with the Comprehension and Collection Axiom schemes reinforced to allow for ∆ 2 and Σ 2 formulae respectively.
We note that KP alone does not prove Σ 1 -Separation . The Separation axioms are themselves essentially "boldface" axioms, as they allow parameters into the axiom schemes. If we wish to refer to, e.g., parameter free Σ 2 -Separationwe shall call this Σ 2 -Separation 0 . The class of all admissible ordinals other than ω, we shall denote by "ADM". For information on admissibility theory the reader may consult [1] . The reals of a model of KP +Σ i -Separationform a model of Π 1 i+1 -CA 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. We follow the definitions and development of the theories Π 1 i+1 -CA 0 (the latter we take to include the set induction axiom) of [11] . The set of reals belonging to L α ,where α is least such that L α is a model of KP +Σ i -Separation, are those of the minimum β-model of Π 
The least such α then being the first that is the union of an ω-length such chain. As a consequence KP +Σ i -Separation proves the existence of β-models whose reals code Σ i -elementary chains of length, say 2:
Arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions.
Let Γ : P(ω) → P(ω) be any arithmetic operator (that is "n ∈ Γ(X)" is arithmetic; we emphasise that Γneed be neither monotone nor progressive). We define the following iterates of Γ : Γ 0 (X) = X; Γ α+1 (X) = Γ(Γ α (X)); Γ λ (X) = lim inf α→λ Γ α (X) = ∪ α<λ ∩ λ>β>α Γ β (X). Following Burgess we say that Y ⊆ ωis arithmetically quasi-inductive if for some such Γ, Y is (1-1) reducible toΓ On (∅). Any such definition has a least countable ξ = ξ(Γ) with Γ ξ (∅) = Γ On (∅). If we let ζ denote the supremum of all such ξ(Γ), then we have:
In general we shall stay with the notation that Σ denotes the ordinal height of the least properΣ 2 -end extension ofL ζ .
Proposition 2 There is a recursive operator Γ with ξ(Γ) = ζ.
Some quasi-inductive definitions may reach a fixed point.
Definition 1
We say that Γ reaches a fixed point on X,if there is α so that Γ α (X) = Γ α+1 (X); and if so we call Γ α (X) the fixed point.
Proposition 3 For any arithmetical operator Γ, either ξ(Γ) = ζ, or else there is an equivalent recursive operatorΓ which reaches Γ ξ(Γ) (∅) as a fixed point, that is there is a recursive operatorΓ with:
The quasi-inductive definitions that reach fixed points (on ∅, or on some particular input X) form an interesting subclass. Investigation of such is an appealing combination of admissibility theory and reflection properties of ordinals.
Propositions 4 and 6 indicate that in one sense, to study recursive operators, is to study all arithmetic ones: if one has a Σ n -definable operator, one seemingly only needs to look instead at Π n+1 -reflecting ordinals. For such an operator Γas in Proposition 4, it is easy to see from the definition of (ζ, Σ) that Γ ζ (∅) = Γ Σ (∅) and thus we might call (ζ, Σ) a "repeat pair" for Γ and ∅. Again one may show for such a Γ, that (ζ, Σ)is the lexicographic least such repeat pair. We use this to formulate a definition allowing parameters x as starting inputs.
Definition 2 AQI is the sentence: "For every arithmetic operator Γ,for every x ⊆ ω, there is a wellordering W with a repeat pair (ζ(Γ, x), Σ(Γ, x)) in Field(W )". If an arithmetic operator Γ acting on x has a repeat pair, we say that Γ converges (with input x).
Clearly a certain amount of set theory (or analysis) is needed to show that every operator converges. Reformulated using Prop. 3, this is thus:
We note some facts concerning the pair (ζ, Σ) in L:
Prop. 9 (i) then already shows that AQI is stronger than ∆ 1 3 -CA 0 since any Σ 2 -extendible is already a (union of) β-models of this theory. In Sections 2,3 we prove Theorems 2, and 1 of the abstract respectively.
Strategies and game trees.
We assume familiarity with the basic notions of two person perfect information games played using integers. We shall follow Martin and shall assume that such games are played on game trees T ⊆ <ω ω where we do allow terminal nodes. We let G(A; T ) denote the game with payoff set A ∩ T where T denotes the set of all plays in T . For q ∈ T we let T q denote the set of all positions r ∈ T where r ⊇ q.
Lemma 2 Let A be arithmetic; let M be a transitive model of KPI 0 with
Proof "G(A; T ) is not a win for I" is equivalent to "∀σ ∈ <ω ω(σ is not a winning strategy for I in G(A; T ) )"; which in turn is equivalent to : "∀σ(if σ is a strategy for I in G(A; T ) then ∃r ∈ ω ω σ * r / ∈ A ∩ T )". The set {r|σ * r / ∈ A∩ T }is then ∆ 1 1 (σ, T ), and hence, if non-empty with σ ∈ M , has an element in M . This completes (i). For (ii): let T be II 's non-losing quasi-strategy for
For D a class of ordinals we let D * be the closed class of its limit points.
The classes E k we can think of as having depth k in the "Σ 2 -extendible limits of Σ 2 -extendible ..." hierarchy: if γ ∈ E k then there are ordinals
Definition 5 σ 3 = df the least σ so that if any Σ 0 3 game is a win for player I, then I has a winning strategy lying in L σ .
Proof We shall show that the least level of the L-hierarchy that is a model of the antecedent theory is a model M 0 = L δ in which Σ In fact we shall prove something slightly stronger in the form of the following Lemma:
We do this, using a technique that goes back to Friedman, by defining certain games G ψ so that codes for initial segments of the L-hierarchy are recursive in any winning strategy for the game. So henceforth, let M = L δ be the least level of the antecedent theory in the statement of the lemma.
set, then ∃σ(σis a winning strategy for a player inG(A n ; <ω ω))] The expression in curved brackets is Π Hence, were Σ 0 3 -Determinacyto hold in L δ it would be equivalent to some ψ ∈ Ψ. For any ψ ∈ Ψ we define: α ψ =the least β so that L β |= KP +ψ. The following is straightforward:
We shall show for every ψ ∈ Ψ there is a game G ψ with a Π 0 3 payoff set, but without a winning strategy in L α ψ . In view of the comment just before (2), this will suffice.
Fix for the rest of the argument ψ ∈ Ψ. Let α denote α ψ . We consider the following game G = in the usual way, playing in the i'th round integers (m i , n i ). Let z = x ⊕ y. Rules for I. Let T be the theory KP +V = L + ψ. x must be a code for the complete Σ 1 -theory of an ω-model of T +"there is no set model of T ".
We denote by M, E the model I constructs if he obeys this rule. We may regard also as part of the rule that x as given by I should be specified simply
Amongst the codes for sentences that I plays are those of the form t m ∈ On ∧t n ∈ On ∧t m < t n These we shall use to formulate rules for player II . So far the Rules for I amount to a Π 0 2 condition on x and so on z. Let r : ω → ω × ω be a recursive enumeration of ω 2 in which each (i, j) appears infinitely often. Rules for II. At round k: if (i, j) = r(k) and n k = 0, then ∃k < k with n k = m k , and (a) if B = {k < k|(i, j) = r(k ) ∧ n k = 0} = ∅ then if l = max B ∧ n l = m l = t r ∈ On ∧t s ∈ On ∧t r < t s then (b) ∃u ∈ ωm k = t u ∈ On ∧t r ∈ On ∧t u < t r ; (c) if B = ∅ then n k = m k must simply be of the form given at (b) for some u, r.
The winning conditions. II wins if I fails to obey his rules, or both players obey their respective rules and additionally
This is a Σ Remark 1 In other words, if I obeys his rules, II can win if for some (i, j), r −1 "(i, j)in effect picks out an infinite descending chain through the ordinals of the model M that I reveals via the gödel numbers of the Σ 1 sentences that are true there.
Remark 2 II is not allowed to point out that t s < t r until I has asserted this at some earlier stage. II is thus not predicting what the model will look like below t r ; she is merely adverting to the fact that I has revealed that t s < t r .
Lemma 4 I has a winning strategy.
Proof I plays out all "k ∈ A" for all k ∈ A 1 α , and "k ∈A" for all k ∈A 1 α . Obviously then M, E L α ψ , ∈ and II has no chance to pick out any infinite descending chains.
The point is the following:
Lemma 5 Let τ be any winning strategy for I.
From this the theorem then follows as x ∈L α , being essentially the latter's Σ 1 -truth set. Proof of Lemma 5 We argue that, with II only playing constantly n k = 0 for all k, that I is forced to play for x a list of all the correct facts "k ∈ / ∈A" for A = A 1 α .The point is to show that if at any time I deviates from this course of action, then he will lose -and hence the purported strategy τ is not a winning one.
II plays n k = 0 until such a point, if ever, when I asserts k ∈ A or k / ∈ A whereas in realityk / ∈ A 1 α ψ or k ∈ A 1 α ψ . At this point II knows that I's eventual model M, E will be illfounded, and so she must act to discover a descending chain. In this case we shall denote by β = β M = df On ∩ WFP(M ). However she will not yet know, and in fact will not at any move know where β M lies. As (KP) M by the Truncation Lemma (cf.[] [1] ) β M ∈ ADM. By our requirements on the theory T , and upwards persistence of Σ 1 formulae, we must have β M ≤ α ψ . Definition 6 Let F : ω ADM ∩α ψ + 1 be some fixed surjection.
The idea is that at rounds k where r(k) = (i, j) II will be making the working assumption that the ordinal height of the wellfounded part of M , β M , is precisely F (i), and will be trying to find an illfounded chain through On M above β M . She will be working simultaneously on all such possible β M . We shall prove that if I deviates from enumerating A 1 α ψ , knowing that one of them is the correct assumption, she can be successful and win the game G ψ ; thus I is forced to play only the truth concerning A 1 α ψ .
We assume then that I has played an untruth. We concentrate on a fixed i and hence on β = β M = F (i),and describe how II can move in rounds k with r(k) = (i, j).
Then µis a Σ 2 -admissible. But as L β |= KP we shall be able to argue that:
Claim µ ∈ (E * ) * . Proof This will follow by elementary reflection arguments, once we establish that there is a club set
and so by admissibility we can find a club D ⊆ β of closure points ν with f σ "ν ⊆ ν for all σ ∈ T ∩Σ 2 . As H µ 2 = L µ , this shows that L µ ≺ Σ 2 L ν for any ν ∈ D and is more than enough to show that µ ∈ (E * ) * .
This contradicts our smallness assumption on δ as the least such of this type. 
However the supposition implies there is an infinite descending chain of such b in the illfounded part of M . This implies that we have an infinite nested sequence of Σ 2 intervals: there exists b n |n < ω , γ n |n < ω with (γ n ≤ γ n+1 ≤ . . . < b n+1 < b n ), and with (L γn ≺ Σ 2 L bn ) M , for n < ω. This implies that each γ n ∈ E, and in fact in E * , (E * ) * , . . .thus contradicting our smallness hypothesis.
In M, E , every set is given by a Σ 1 parameter free skolem term. Let t k |k ∈ ω be our priorly fixed recursive enumeration of the Σ 1 -skolem functions. II makes the additional working assumption, or guess if you will, that t M j = a 0 , where a 0 is a witness for a to the truth of the last Claim. (Again the point is that II does not know in advance which term in M will denote such a 0 .) As I reveals more and more facts about his model, he must, if M is not to be isomorphic to L α , at some point reveal a Σ 1 -fact which is true in M but false in L α . There really is then such an M -ordinal a 0 . II will, in effect, place this a 0 = t M j at the head of her putative descending chain, and set r 0 = j. In order to choose the next element of the chain II considers the set T = T β 2 . Set T 0 = (T tr 0 2 ) M II now waits until I asserts that some σ 0 is in T 0 , but II sees is not in T .
(If II is wrong in her guess about t j of course, then she may fruitlessly wait for ever...)
II may thus wait until I asserts that some such σ ∈ T 0 \T and additionally that some term t r 1 names the ordinal a 1 defined in (5) above. At some round l then, Ulrich must play the number m l = t r 1 ∈ On ∧t r 0 ∈ On ∧t r 1 < t r 0 ; once all these facts have been gathered together, Agathe may at the next appropriate round k with r(k) = (i, j), set n k = m l .
II now has two elements of a descending chain in the illfounded part of M . Now she watches out for assertions that I makes about T 1 = (T tr 1 2 ) M , waiting for some σ 1 asserted by him to be in T 1 but which does not lie in T . By exactly the same considerations that held at (5) some a 2 , t r 2 , are definable, and so she can continue. By the end of the game, if this working assumption about β M and t j was the correct one, the chain so defined by continuation of this process will be infinite, and she will have won.
If I deviates from playing the correct truth set, then at least one of II 's assumptions will turn out to be a correct one, and hence she will be assured of winning.
QED(Lemma 5 & Theorem 3)
Proof Let α ψ etc. be defined as above. Suppose for a contradiction that α > σ 3 . Suppose ψ is chosen with α ψ least greater than σ 3 .We adjust the games played above. Let G ψ,ϕ be the game described in the last theorem, except that for ϕ ∈ Σ 1 , I must now play a code x for a model of T +"there is no set model of T " +ϕ. Everything else remains the same: II 's task is still to find an infinite descending chain through the ordinals of I's model. Note that if ϕ ∈ T as to what the correct theory of L α ψ actually is, and discovers an infinite descending chain through I's model M . Hence
being the Σ 1 -theory of L α ψ ; but then by admissibility, S ∈ L α ψ , which is absurd as S codes the complete Σ 1 -Theory of this model by Note 2 above.
Remark 3 Both the theorem and so the corollary can be improved a little, thus pushing σ 3 up. 
Elementary considerations show that if this holds, so does:
Notice that if M is a model as described, then parameter-free Σ This will complete the first theorem of the abstract (as well as the nonreversibility of its implication, since by taking γ 0 , γ 1 least with such properties we have that then Σ 2 -Separation fails in L γ 0 ). Proof We shall assume that V = M where M is a model with the above properties. We shall thus drop the subscript M throughout the proof. Let Abe Σ 0 3 (x) for some real x ∈ L γ 0 . We shall also drop the parameter x henceforth, as all the arguments relativise uniformly. Suppose T ∈ L γ 0 is a game tree. We shall show G(A; T ) is determined, with a winning strategy in L γ 0 . We suppose that player I, Ulrich, has no such winning strategy in L γ 0 and shall prove that II , Agathe, does.
is not a win for I) Lγ 0 ; then there is a quasistrategy T * ∈ L γ 0 for II with the following properties:
is not a win for I.
Proof of Lemma. Under the assumption I has no winning strategy in L γ 0 and by Σ 2 reflection, he does not have one in V (= M ) either. If T is II 's non-losing quasi-strategy for G(A; T ), then membership in T is not only Π 1 ,but also Π Lγ 0 1 due to the same Σ 2 reflection. In short T ∈ V . We thus have that for every p ∈ T , G(A, T p ) is not a win for I.
(2) T ∈ L γ 0 Proof Elementary reflection arguments show that there are arbitrarily large ν < γ 0 satisfying L ν ≺ Σ 1 L γ 0 . Thus the sameT is Π 1 (T ) definable here also for a sufficiently large such ν with T ∈ L ν.
Following closely the original argument, we call a positionp ∈ T good if there is a quasi-strategy T * for II in T p so that the following hold:
is not a win for I. We are thus trying to prove that the starting position ∅ is good, since if such a quasi-strategy T * exists, then such will also exist in L γ 0 by Σ 2 reflection. As (ii) is Π 1 (T * ) by Lemma 2 we have: (2) "p is good" is Σ 2 (T ). Let H ⊆ <ω ω be the class of p that are good. Then (3) H ∈ Σ Lγ 0 2 (T ) and hence H is a set in V . We define the function t : H −→ L γ 0 by: t(p) = L-least quasistrategy (p) witnessing (i) and (ii) that p is good.
Then t is Σ 1 (H, T ) ∩ Σ 2 (T ) and t ∈ V as a function.
Let B = ∩ n∈ω D n with each D n recursively open. Define
The proof proceeds by showing (+) ∃n ∈ ω(G(E n ; T ) is not a win for I).
We first suppose this shown and see how to devise a T * demonstrating that ∅ is good and thus that the lemma holds. Fix such an nwitnessing that (+)holds .
is not a win for I)}. That this is Π 1 then follows from (4) and Lemma 2. By Σ 1 -reflection it is then Π Lγ 1 1 (H, T ) and hence is a set.
Firstly we shall put qinto T * if (a) q ∈ T and for all positions p ⊆ q T p D n ; otherwise (b) there is a shortest initial segment p ⊆ q with p ∈ T and T p ⊆ D n . In this latter case, by definition of T p is good. If the subsequent moves in q are consistent with t(p) =T (p), then we also put
, and t is definable over L γ where γ is the L-rank of H. The complexity of T * is thus that of T .
(7) T * witnesses that ∅ is good. Proof If x ∈ T * , then either x / ∈ D n or x ∈ T (p) . In the latter case (i) ensures that x / ∈ B. Thus T * ∩ B = ∅. We must show that G(A; T * ) is not a win for Ulrich . Suppose for a contradiction that σ were a winning strategy for I for this game. Note that there cannot be a position p consistent with σ so that T p ⊆ D n :for otherwise for this p we have T * p =T (p); butT (p) has property (ii) and so G(A; T * p ) is not a win forI. But then σ cannot after all be a winning strategy for I in G(A; T * ). As there is no such position p like this, we must have that ∀x σ * x ∈ T . But T is II's non-losing quasi-strategy for G(E n ; T ). Hence I has no winning strategy for G(E n ; T ). (Suppose that τ 0 were a winning strategy forI in this game. The usual argument is that τ 0 means that x ∈ A by the definition of E n . On the other hand, if all the p n are defined, then we shall have that x ∈ ∩ n∈ω D n ⊆ B ⊆ A. Either way we have shown that any play x arising from following the strategy σ lies in A. However this contradicts the assumption that I has no winning strategy for G(A; T ). This finishes the proof of the Lemma.
The proof of the theorem now follows Martin [8] pretty much verbatim but again paying attention to definability issues. We repeatedly apply the Lemma with A = ∪ n∈ω A n and each A n ∈ Π 0 2 , acting in turn as an instance of B in the Lemma. This is a Σ 2 -recursion defining a strategy τ for II over L γ 0 since all the relevant quasi-strategies given by the Lemma lie in this model. These details now follow.
One applies the lemma with B = A 0 obtaining a quasi-strategy for II : T * (∅). By Σ 2 -reflection the L-least such lies in L γ 0 , and we shall assume that T * (∅) refers to it. For any position p 1 ∈ T with lh(p 1 ) = 1, let τ (p 1 )be some arbitrary but fixed move in T (∅), II 's non-losing quasi-strategy for the game G(A, T * (∅)). The relation "p ∈ T (∅)" is Π 2 ({T * (∅)}) and thus T (∅) also lies in L γ 0 . For definiteness we let τ (p 1 ) be the numerically least move. For any play, p 2 say, of length 2 consistent with the above definition of τ so far, we apply the lemma again with B = A 1 and with (T * (∅)) p 2 replacing T . This yields a quasi-strategy for II, call it T * (p 2 ), which is definable in a Σ 2 way over L γ 0 , in the parameter (T * (∅)) p 2 . Let T (p 2 ) ∈ L γ 0 be II 's non-losing quasi-strategy for G(A, T * (p 2 )), this time with "y = T (p 2 )" ∈ ∆ Lγ 0 2 ({T * (p 2 )}). Again for p 3 ∈ T * (p 2 ) any position of length 3, let τ (p 3 )be some arbitrary but fixed move in T (p 2 ). Now we consider appropriate moves p 4 of length 4, and reapply the lemma with B = A 2 and (T * (p 2 )) p 4 . Continuing in this way we obtain a strategy τ for II so that τ 2k+1 ω, for k < ω, is defined by a recursion that is Σ Lγ 0 2 ({T }). As L γ 0 |= Σ 2 -KP, we have that τ ∈ L γ 0 . If x is any play consistent with τ, either x is finite, in which case x ∈ T (∅), and thus T (∅) x ⊆A, and hence x / ∈ A; or else x is infinite. In this latter case, for every n, by the defining properties of T * (p 2n )given by the relevant application of the lemma, x ∈ T * (x 2n) ⊆ ¬A n. Hence x / ∈ A, and in both cases τ is a winning strategy for II as required. QED(Theorem)
